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An investigation was conducted to estimate the relative
impact the six susceptibility reduction concepts of threat
warning, tactics, signature reduction, noise jammers and
deceivers, expendables, and threat suppression have on
aircraft survivability, with particular emphasis given to
tactics with increased aircraft performance and signature
reduction. An essential elements analysis (EEA) was
conducted for three representative scenarios, with and
without threat warning available, to identify the essential
events and elements in each scenario critical to aircraft
survivability. The six concepts were assessed as to their
relative impact on the essential events and an estimate of
the aircraft's susceptibility and survivability was made.
The results of the EEAs are presented in tabular format.
The general conclusion is made that both increased aircraft
performance, with threat warning available, and signature
reduction, with and without threat warning available, play
important roles in increasing aircraft survivability through
a reduction in an aircraft's susceptibility.
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A fundamental consideration in the design of military
aircraft today is combat survivability. Without it, the
ability of the aircraft to complete its mission is
jeopardized. Aircraft combat survivability is dependent
upon many factors, such as eliminating tailpipe exhaust
smoke, employing optimal tactics, and/or using camouflage
paint schemes, to name but just a few. A definition of
survivability that includes all of the above factors is "the
capability of an aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a man-
made hostile environment." [Ref. l:p. 1] The probability
that the aircraft can survive the environment, Ps , is
related to the probability that it will be killed by the
environment, PK , by
PS = 1 - PK . [Ref. 1]
The probability of kill is the product of the aircraft's
probability of hit by one or more damage mechanisms, PH ,
known as the aircraft's susceptibility and its conditional
probability of a kill given a hit, Pk/H' known as the
aircraft's vulnerability. Thus,
PK = PH PK/H- C Ref - H
Aircraft vulnerability is the inability of an aircraft
to withstand one or more hits by the damage mechanisms. The
more vulnerable an aircraft is, the more likely it will be
killed when hit. To a large degree, vulnerability is a
function of the design of the aircraft. By determining in
advance those aircraft components that possess a high level
or degree of vulnerability, steps may be taken in the design
phase to reduce the overall vulnerability of the aircraft.
This process is called vulnerability reduction, and it can
significantly reduce the likelihood of an aircraft being
killed if it is hit without sacrificing aircraft
performance, weight, cost and combat effectiveness. [Ref.
1]
Susceptibility is the inability of an aircraft to avoid
being damaged in the performance of its mission. Three
major factors determine an aircraft's susceptibility: the
scenario, the threat, and the aircraft itself. Thus,
susceptibility is influenced by many things, and the
reduction of an aircraft's susceptibility reguires a
thorough knowledge of the seguence of events, beginning with
aircraft launch and initial detection by enemy sensors to
the final impact by one or more damage mechanisms, such as
missile warhead fragments and blast. Key elements in
determining an aircraft's susceptibility are the enemy's
threat surveillance activity, target identification,
acquisition, tracking, and engagement, and the specific
threat warhead characteristics, such as warhead size and
fuzing. [Ref. 1]
B. SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT
The two aircraft attributes that affect survivability
are its susceptibility and its vulnerability. By reducing
the levels of either of these two attributes, substantial
increases in survivability can be achieved. [Ref. 1]
Survivability enhancement begins with a survivability
assessment to include the systematic description, delinea-
tion, quantification, and statistical characterization of an
aircraft's survivability during an encounter with enemy
threat systems. It combines the results of a mission threat
analysis that describes specific threats to the aircraft
during expected scenarios, the results of a vulnerability
assessment for the various threat propagators, and the
results of a susceptibility assessment that outlines key
parameters and variables such as aircraft radar and infrared
signatures and propagator miss distances. [Ref. 1]
Susceptibility reduction is accomplished through a
myriad of measures designed to impair the enemy's ability to
engage a target. The susceptibility reduction concepts are
threat warning, noise jammers and deceivers, signature
reduction, expendables, threat suppression, and tactics.
[Ref. 1]
Vulnerability reduction requires the incorporation of
any design techniques or pieces of equipment that reduce or
control the amount or the consequence of damage to the
aircraft caused by one or more damage mechanisms. As with
susceptibility, there are six concepts which reduce one or
more aspects of an aircraft's vulnerability. These six
concepts are component redundancy (with separation)
,
component location, passive damage suppression, active
damage suppression, component shielding, and component
elimination. By careful examination, the appropriate
reduction concept and/or concepts can be applied to prevent
the loss of a particularly vulnerable component/ system.
[Ref. 1]
C. TACTICAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT DESIGN GOALS
A major goal in the design of tactical combat aircraft
is to make them effective in any scenario. In order to be
effective, an aircraft must be survivable. Survivability in
combat is a function of many factors, such as fire/explosion
protection, threat system capabilities, non-flammable
hydraulic fluid, the scenario and, as emphasized today,
aircraft performance and signatures. Improving the
performance of an aircraft through improvements in speed and
maneuverability can reduce exposure time in the threat
envelopes, increase its capability to outmaneuver a greater
number of enemy fighters and missiles, and result in
reducing the aircraft's susceptibility, thereby increasing
its survivability. In the context of the six susceptibility
concepts, aircraft performance falls within the tactics
concept because tactics are developed using aircraft
performance as a primary consideration. [Ref. 1]
Signature reduction in the form of reduced radar cross
section (RCS) or reduced infrared (IR) signature can also
enhance aircraft survivability. Reducing the reflected or
generated electromagnetic energy of an aircraft will
adversely affect both a threat system's reaction time and
its engagement envelope by reducing its ability to acguire,
track, and engage a target. These delays reduce the chances
the aircraft will be engaged during its mission, thereby
improving its survivability. [Refs. 1,2]
It's important to note here that an aircraft's RCS is
dependent not only on the frequency of the radar, but also
on the aircraft's aspect relative to the radar that is
tracking it. There is not just one value for the RCS of an
aircraft. In most cases, aircraft radar signatures are
normally assumed to refer to the average head-on aspect
unless otherwise stated. [Ref. 3]
1. Performance Criteria
Among the many design goals, aircraft
maneuverability and agility are receiving added emphasis
today. Given an aircraft's state vector, "maneuverability
can be thought of as the first derivative of this state,
while agility is the second derivative" [Ref. 4].
Maneuverability can also be defined as the ability of an
aircraft to change its velocity vector in both magnitude and
direction. Although agility is not as rigidly defined as
the other performance parameters, this characteristic refers
to the ease and rapidity with which a particular aircraft's
state of motion may be altered with confidence, precision
and complete control. As evidenced by the Grumman X-29 and
the multi-national X-31, future fighters must incorporate
designs to reduce drag without compromising aircraft
maneuverability or agility. These new goals are turning the
aircraft industry's attention to that of exploring radically
different concepts and designs in their quest to achieve the
maximum aircraft performance possible. [Refs. 4,5,6,7,8,9,
10,11]
To gain the combat edge and achieve the desired
design goals, specific performance criteria for a combat
aircraft must be delineated and designed in the aircraft.
Once the mission or missions have been decided upon, several
performance criteria may be submitted to the potential
airframe manufacturers by the cognizant authority (Naval Air
Systems Command for the U.S. Navy). These criteria may
include as a minimum the takeoff roll, landing distance,
time to climb, sustained turn rate, and instantaneous turn
rate. Achieving these criteria is the end result of the
structural integrity, aerodynamic qualities, and powerplant
characteristics of the aircraft. After careful analysis,
final decisions regarding the engine size, types, and
number, along with the wing characteristics, such as aspect
ratio, wing loading and size, can be made which will result
in meeting as many of the performance criteria as possible.
The evolution of the aircraft design is an iterative
process, requiring juggling of various innovative design
features in order to optimize performance and achieve as
many of the performance criteria as possible. [Ref. 12]
2 . Aircraft Signature Reduction Goals
With the advent of extremely capable threat air
defense systems, the emphasis on combat aircraft signature
reduction has dramatically increased. Today several
aircraft are being designed with reduced signatures as one
of the major design goals. Through a reduction in radar
cross section and infrared signatures, the aircraft becomes
more difficult to initially detect, acquire, track, and
engage. By significantly reducing the aircraft's RCS, the
radar's maximum detection range may be significantly
reduced. Additionally, reducing the aircraft's radiant
intensity reduces an IR missile seeker's lock-on range. The
key to successfully reaching these signature reduction goals
is to achieve them without compromising the aircraft's
performance, with the ultimate goal being increased aircraft
survivability through reduced susceptibility. [Refs. 1,10,
13,14]
3 . The Requirements for Threat Warning
Many of the susceptibility reduction features
available to the aircrew operate most efficiently when
specific information concerning threat operations is
available. With timely and accurate threat warning,
critical life saving actions, such as threat suppression,
the employment of onboard chaff, flares, and deceptive
jamming equipment coordinated with recommended evasive
maneuvers, and the initiation of stand-off jamming can be
taken. Thus, to adequately estimate the relative impact
that increased aircraft performance and signature reduction
have on aircraft survivability, these features will be
analyzed with and without onboard threat warning available
from either a radar homing and warning (RHAW) receiver or a
radar warning receiver (RWR) . To do otherwise may result in
misleading or incorrect conclusions. [Refs. 1,5,9,12]
D. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR INCREASED AIRCRAFT
PERFORMANCE AND SIGNATURE REDUCTION
1. Increased Aircraft Performance Considerations
Aircraft design is impacted by many design goals
such as maneuverability, agility, and takeoff and landing
requirements. By specifying the mission or missions of the
aircraft, establishing design goals, and defining
performance criteria, such as design Mach number, certain
aircraft characteristics become fixed. For example, the
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design Mach number fixes the sweepback angle of the wing.
This is a crucial design consideration for aircraft that
will operate in the high subsonic and supersonic flight
regimes. However, for supersonic flight, a high thrust-to-
weight (T/W) ratio is required which will directly relate to
an aircraft's maximum speed at various altitudes. Addition-
ally, the aircraft's design will be significantly affected
by the maneuverability and/or agility required. An aircraft
with appropriate thrust-to-weight ratio and wing sweepback
to meet the design Mach number may not necessarily meet the
maneuverability and/or agility requirements. Thus, the
design must also include computer controlled flight control
systems which can rapidly adjust appropriate flight control
surfaces to efficiently convert the energy available to
maneuvering energy for optimum maneuverability and agility
without compromising other performance factors. [Refs. 5,
8,12]
Over the past 4 years, an increasing demand has
been made on engineers to reach more stringent design
criteria that have resulted in some rather radical designs.
Design trends in wing shape alone have produced aft swept
and forward swept, delta, and variable sweep wing
configurations. All are examples of designers attempting to
meet the performance criteria while also meeting the
specific mission requirements and profiles. Each aircraft
is a compromise of many design factors and results in a
unique aircraft best suited for a particular mission or
missions. [Ref. 15]
2 . Aircraft RCS Reduction Considerations
The radar cross section of an aircraft is a very
complex parameter that is dependent on the size,
configuration, aspect, and material composition of the
aircraft, as well as the wavelength and polarization of the
radar signal. Consequently, designers must be aware of the
geometric shapes and materials that reradiate the incident
radar signal toward the receiving antenna. For example,
traditional engine inlet designs have been generally round
or tetragonal shapes which cause multiple or sequential
reflections of a radar signal . These multiple reflections
produce individual returns that are added vectorially.
Because the individual reflected signals will take different
paths back to the radar receiver, each signal will have a
unique phase. These phases may add or subtract to produce a
nominal average RCS. Consequently, in the design of an
aircraft, shapes that are relatively flat, dihedrals, and
corners should be avoided, orientated, or located in an
attempt to reduce an aircraft's RCS. This technique is
called shaping and has been a driving force in helping to
reduce radar cross sections of various aircraft. [Refs.
1,2]
Other RCS reduction design techniques include the




and active cancellation. RAM uses specially developed
paints, such as ferrite-based and/or carbon based microwave
absorbing materials, known for their lossy behavior, to act
as radar absorbers. The remaining two methods are extremely
ambitious, complex, and very frequency dependent. As a
result of these problems, passive cancellation is no longer
considered a practical technique. Active cancellation is a
"smart" technique requiring a tremendous amount of
parametric information concerning the signal characteristics
so that a computerized system can generate a phase equal and
opposite to the impinging radar signal resulting in cancel-
lation. This technique has not been given wide publicity
concerning its use as a means of RCS reduction in current or
future aircraft. [Refs. 1,16,17]
The penalties for RCS reduction include cost,
payload reduction, reduced range, added weight, and
increased maintenance. However, since the bulk of the
signature reduction technology is highly classified, the
extent to which these penalties actually impact mission
effectiveness is not known. [Refs. 1,17]
3 . Aircraft Infrared Signature Reduction Considerations
Equally as complex as an aircraft's radar cross
section is its infrared siqnature. The primary contributors
to an aircraft's IR signature are the aircraft's engines,
the engine exhausts, and the metal components that either
reflect or emit electromagnetic energy with wavelengths
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between .77 and 1000 ys within the optical band. The most
significant parameter to predict the levels of emitted
radiation is the temperature of the particular component of
an aircraft. Using an absolute temperature scale (Kelvin)
as a reference, the intensity of radiation is a function of
the temperature above absolute zero at which the aircraft
components operate. With knowledge of the source
temperature (degrees Kelvin) , the wavelength, X, correspond-
ing to the peak spectral radiant emittance (watts/cm 2/ pi) can
be determined using Wein's displacement law mathematically
expressed as
X ( us) = 2893/T(K)
.
With the knowledge of the emitted wavelengths of the
particular components of the aircraft, the important task of
eliminating or significantly reducing the reflected
electromagnetic energy in these bands begins. [Ref. 1]
Various techniques are used to reduce IR signatures.
However, they all focus efforts on reducing the temperature,
area, and emissivity or reflectivity of those components
exploited by an IR weapon. Design considerations are most
effective when incorporated early in the design process.
Retrofitting infrared suppression can be costly from a
performance perspective since some of the techniques require
shielding, which adds weight, or employ jet exhaust cooling
12
and mixing devices that may reduce the net propulsive force
of the engine, as well as increase weight. Thus,
backfitting an aircraft with IR signature reduction devices
may be a very costly measure from both performance and
financial viewpoints. [Refs. 1,14]
E. THESIS GOAL AND SCOPE
1. Goal
The general goal of this thesis is to present a
logical approach for analyzing the effects of the six
susceptibility reduction concepts on combat aircraft
survivability. The effects of threat warning, tactics using
increased performance, signature reduction (specifically RCS
and infrared reduction) , noise jammers and deceivers,
expendables, and threat suppression will be examined to
determine their impact on future aircraft survivability.
This will be accomplished by conducting an essential
elements analysis to identify time critical events in the
scenario starting with the final undesired event, aircraft
destruction, and culminating with the initial event,
aircraft initial detection. The susceptibility reduction
concepts will be assessed as to their relative impact on the




The specific scope of the thesis will be limited to
U.S. Navy tactical attack and fighter aircraft and their
respective missions in overland and war-at-sea scenarios.
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Due to classification considerations, the scenarios and
mission descriptions will be generic, but as representative
as possible. Additionally, the scope of the susceptibility
reduction discussion will focus primarily on the effects
increased aircraft performance and signature reduction, with
and without threat warning available, have on aircraft
survivability.
F. THESIS OUTLINE
The thesis consists of five sections. The first chapter
discusses the emphasis of increased performance and
signature reduction on aircraft design. The second chapter
describes the U.S. Navy's missions and functions, and
current and projected Navy attack and fighter aircraft
missions. Chapter III discusses various threat systems and
generic scenarios. Chapter IV is a susceptibility
assessment using an EEA done in conjunction with a
susceptibility reduction analysis. Chapter V contains the
study summary and conclusions.
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II. THE EMPHASIS OF INCREASED AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
AND SIGNATURE REDUCTION ON AIRCRAFT DESIGN
A. INCREASED AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
One goal of aircraft designers has always been to
maximize aircraft performance. Today's highly maneuverable
aircraft are the result of increased technology in
powerplants, wing design, and composite materials. As
tactical jets have evolved, maximum performance in terms of
both speed and thrust-to-weight ratios, combined with
increased maneuverability, has been equated to effective-
ness. Figure 1 [Refs. 9,10,15,18] shows representative U.S.
Navy and Air Force attack/bomber and fighter aircraft
performance trends since 1944 in terms of maximum high
altitude (above 20,000 ft) Mach number and thrust-to-weight
ratios. With the exception of the B-58A Hustler for
attack/bomber aircraft and the F-5E Tiger for fighters,
there is clearly a steady upward trend in terms of these two
parameters. [Refs. 9,15,18]
Following World War II, the jet age saw the emergence of
a variety of jet fighters which flew at moderately high
subsonic Mach numbers. Soon after the Korean War, the first
generation of swept wing aircraft capable of exceeding Mach
1 were introduced. With the increased speeds came increased
thrust-to-weight ratios. By the mid 1950 's, as Figure 1
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maximum clean speeds of better than Mach 1 at high altitude
(above 20,000 ft) and nearly a 50 percent increase in
thrust-to-weight ratios. Attack/bomber aircraft saw a
similar trend, but were generally only capable of high
subsonic Mach numbers. [Refs. 6,9,15,18]
With the increases in aircraft speeds, tactics shifted
to that of an interceptor, hit-and-run, or deception
profiles to take advantage of this capability. However, as
a result of close-in air engagements brought about by the
need for visually identifying the enemy during the Vietnam
War, pilots began to emphasize the need for trading excess
speed for maneuverability and agility. This increased
maneuverability and agility could give a pilot the edge by
allowing him to reach a firing solution for his air-to-air
missiles or guns prior to his opponent doing the same.
Additionally, extremely capable anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were being
introduced which meant speed was no longer a completely
effective survivability technique. In fact, the excess
speed combined with rather poor maneuverability and agility
produced some disturbing effects. Newly developed evasive
maneuvers for use against SAMs resulted in a large turn
radius, with pilot's experiencing very high gravitational
forces, commonly referred to as "G's." [Refs. 8,9,13,15,19,
20]
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Consequently, the emphasis in design rapidly shifted to
transferring this excess speed into maneuvering energy. By
designing an aircraft capable of moderately high supersonic
Mach numbers, but with outstanding "G" available at moderate
subsonic speeds, a properly warned pilot's ability to
outmaneuver more capable enemy fighter aircraft missiles and
surface-to-air missiles could be significantly increased.
The ability to intimidate the enemy and gain the advantage
by either rapidly pointing your nose at the opponent or
quickly reaching the firing envelope would contribute to a
smaller P^ and an increased Ps . [Refs. 1,5,8,9]
In order to achieve increased maneuverability and
agility, significant changes in aircraft wing structure and
general design evolved. Variable geometry winged aircraft
were developed to better convert energy into increased
maneuverability and agility. Although the initial concept
of variable geometry was first introduced in 1943, it was
not incorporated into a United States tactical or strategic
aircraft until the F-111A Aardvark was built. The variable
geometry design allowed better lift at slow speeds and
radically reduced wave drag in supersonic flight regimes.
From the attack aircraft perspective, one other significant
advantage was the excellent ride quality at very low
altitudes and high speeds. This was truly a benefit since
attack/bomber tactics then and now emphasize the use of
terrain masking at low altitude for increased survivability.
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However, variable geometry wings were not universally
adopted primarily due to weight and perceived wing ordnance
carrying difficulties. [Refs. 9,10,18]
Design trends have now focused on a camber fixed wing,
but with the ability to change its profile in flight through
the use of intricately controlled leading and trailing edge
control surfaces. Today, an aircraft's wing planform and
section profile can be optimized in flight to better adjust
to rapidly changing threat scenarios. A variety of other
innovations such as the predominance of twin tail configura-
tions, canards, and slender wings to increase performance at
high angles of attack were also introduced. Finally, by
incorporating highly advanced computer controlled flight
systems that instantaneously monitor and maintain optimal
flight stability, the static stability reguirement for jet
fighters and attack aircraft could be relaxed allowing never
before reached levels of maneuverability and agility to be
achieved. [Refs. 1,9,10,18,21]
Vectored thrust is yet another method under study to
improve pitch and roll maneuverability and agility. By
replacing the tailpipe with two dimensional moveable
sections encased around the exhaust and orienting them in
such a way as to redirect the thrust vector, moments about
the aircraft's center of gravity are created, thereby
enhancing maneuverability and agility. [Refs. 1,9,10]
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New advances in the development of composites, such as
boron- and graphite-epoxy, have allowed engineers to develop
aircraft structures that are lightweight, strong, and
corrosion resistant. Tailored stiffness qualities are now
making possible the introduction of forward swept wing
fighters and attack aircraft. This unique configuration is
of high interest due to the benefits of reduced drag and
improved maneuverability and agility at virtually all Mach
numbers. The obvious benefit of forward swept composite
wings would be to build an aircraft with smaller, more
efficient wings and engines to achieve the same or better
performance as that of a conventionally designed aircraft.
Thus, this aircraft could fly at relatively high Mach
numbers with a smaller more efficient engine, and it could
possibly also benefit from reduced radar and infrared
signatures without sacrificing mission effectiveness.
[Refs. 1,9,19,22]
Once the aircraft has been designed and built, one of
the best tools for assessing its performance capabilities is
the altitude versus Mach number (H-M) diagram. This diagram
presents the maximum aerodynamic and structural characteris-
tics of the aircraft as determined from flight testing and
mathematical calculations. On a typical diagram, as shown
in Figure 2 [Ref. 5], curves of an aircraft's specific
energy, Es , and its specific excess power, Ps , are plotted.




































energy, H, and its kinetic energy, V2/2G, and can be
mathematically expressed as
Es (ft) = H + (V
2/2G)
where H equals the aircraft's altitude above some reference
(ft), V equals the aircraft's true airspeed (ft/sec), and G
equals the acceleration due to gravity (32.2 ft/sec2 ).
These lines of constant Es on Figure 2 define the many speed
and altitude combinations an aircraft may have for the same
energy state. [Ref. 5]
A change in the energy state of an aircraft is done
through the addition of power and for jets is generally the
result of increased thrust. The added power results in a
change in the aircraft's E s . The ability of the aircraft to
change the £ s is determined by its Ps , which is
mathematically expressed as
Ps (ft/sec) = [ (T-D) V]/W
where T equals total engine thrust (lbs) , D equals the total
aircraft drag (lbs) , W equals the aircraft weight (lbs) , and
V equals the aircraft's true airspeed (ft/sec). [Ref. 5]
The Ps equation reveals that whenever the thrust exceeds
the drag, the Ps for that aircraft will be positive,
reflecting excess energy levels available for climbing or
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accelerating. Conversely, if drag is greater than thrust,
energy levels will decrease, resulting in the inability of
the aircraft to climb or accelerate. [Ref. 5]
A significant amount of information about an aircraft
can be obtained from these diagrams. For example, by
referring to Figure 2 and following along the Ps = curve,
the following information [Ref. 5] can be obtained at the
appropriate letter:
a) minimum sustained Mach number for any altitude ( . 3M at
sea level)
,
b) maximum sustained subsonic altitude and Mach number
(56,000 ft at .9M)
,
c) maximum sustained altitude at any speed (67,000 ft at
1.95M)
,
d) maximum sustained Mach number at any altitude (2.2M at
55,000 ft)
e) maximum sustained Mach number at sea level (1.35M).
Other parameters, such as climb performance, controllability
limits, and acceleration performance, can also be found on
appropriate H-M diagrams. [Ref. 5]
Aircraft performance can also be measured by its ability
to meet required criteria such as takeoff and landing
distances, and turn performance. The two most common
parameters for assessing turn performance are sustained "G"
available and instantaneous "G" available. The former
refers to turns accomplished while maintaining a constant
energy level for an extended period of time, and the latter
refers to the aircraft's maximum turn capabilities while
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losing or gaining energy at an explicit rate. In
conjunction with these two parameters are the aircraft's
turn radius and turn rate. Turn radius, R, usually measured
in feet or miles, is a function of the aircraft's airspeed
(ft/sec) , V, and the load factor, n, which equals the lift
force divided by the aircraft's weight. This can be
mathematically expressed as
R (ft) = V2/[G (n 2 -l)
-5]
where G is the acceleration due to gravity. Turn rate,
usually measured in degrees per second, is also a function
of the aircraft's airspeed and load factor and can be
expressed mathematically as
Turn Rate (degrees/sec) = [57.3 G (n2 -l) • 5]/ (V)
Figure 3 [Ref. 5] shows charts defining both turn radius and
turn rates for a generic aircraft based upon true airspeed
and specific values of L/W in terms of "G's." [Refs. 5,9,
12,23]
Improved performance is a very hot topic in almost any
military or civilian arena today. Current trends and
efforts only serve to emphasize the expanded horizons on
which future aircraft performance will evolve.
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Figure 3. Aircraft Turn Performance [Ref. 5]
25
B. RADAR CROSS SECTION SIGNATURE REDUCTION
Today, aircraft design is taking a marked change in
another direction. For the same reasons that attention has
been given to increasing aircraft performance, the aircraft
designer's attention has also been turned to that of
reducing aircraft radar signature. The obvious benefit from
RCS signature reduction is the reduction in reaction time by
enemy defenses due to a reduction in the maximum detection
range, Rmax' °f a radar. With the assumptions that
multipath echoes are not present, the target is always in
the line of sight of the radar, and all of the radar's
parameters remain constant, the relationship between RCS
signature reduction and Rmax reduction is governed by the
fourth root. This can be mathematically represented as
Rmax = t( pr Gr w^ * F
4 )/((4TT)-3 l N (S/N) min )] .25
where Pr is the radar's peak power output, Gr is the radar's
antenna gain, W is the radar's wavelength, a is the
aircraft's RCS, F is the multipath factor, L is the signal
and echo power losses, N is the amount of inherent noise
within the signal bandwidth of the radar's receiver and S/N
is the ratio of echo power to the radar receiver's noise
power often referred to as the signal-to-noise ratio.
Consequently, the level of RCS signature reduction required
to gain an appreciable reduction in the radar's maximum
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detection range is significant. For a 44% reduction in
maximum detection range, a 90% reduction in RCS is required.
This is shown in Table 1 for a generic fire control radar.
[Refs. 1,2,10]
TABLE 1
RCS SIGNATURE REDUCTION IMPACT
Frequency 16 Ghz
Wavelength .02 meters
Peak Power (Pr) 100,000 Watts (50db)
Antenna Gain (Gr) 10,000 Watts (40db)
Multipath Echoes (F) 1 (none)
Receiver Noise (N) 2.5 * 10~ 16 Watts (-156db)
Losses (L) 15.85 Watts (12db)








100 - 189 -
10 90 106 44
1 99 60 68
.1 99.9 34 83
RCS signature reduction techniques rely on the use of
shapes and materials to reduce the echo seen by the radar.
This new technology has already been a major factor in the
design of several aircraft. Specific information concerning
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the levels of RCS signature reduction, predicted
effectiveness, and aircraft performance are classified at
the highest levels, but open source literature indicates
performance characteristics of the new generation of reduced
RCS aircraft are in keeping with current fighter and attack
aircraft. It's interesting to note that the Soviets in a
September-October 1986 article in The Soviet Press; Selected
Translations believe the advanced tactical fighter will
incorporate signature reduction technology, be capable of
cruising supersonical ly , and have exceptional
maneuverability (8 "G's" at altitude). [Refs. 1,10,22]
In order to reduce the RCS of an aircraft, the portion
of the incident radar signal reradiated in the direction of
the threat radar's receiver must be reduced. As early as
1929, Mr. Jack Northrup demonstrated the feasibility of
using a flying wing aircraft as a viable asset for military
purposes. In 1944, aerodynamicists in Germany realized the
significance of the flying wing design, not only from an
aerodynamical ly efficient point of view, but also from the
standpoint of the RCS reduction this design offered.
Ironically, by about this same time Mr. Northrup had
convinced the Army Air Corps that the "flying wing" should
be built. [Refs. 1,2,3]
Designated the XB-3 5, this rather heavy bomber (gross
weight of about 155,000 lbs) was a unique configuration
requiring an exceptionally advanced control system and
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specially designed control surfaces called "elevons." These
controlling surfaces were a combination elevator and aileron
and gave the XB-35 its rolling, pitching, and directional
control. Plagued by a series of both mechanical failures
and vibrational problems, and with the advent of the jet
age, this four engine, propeller driven aircraft was
eventually shelved. Modified with four turbine engines and
redesignated the YB-49, another attempt was made to convince
the Air Force the concept was valid. Doomed from the start
for reasons of directional stability and a drastic reduction
in range and payload capability, the YB-49 was scrapped.
[Ref. 3]
The flying wing design was a logical choice that used
the RCS reduction technigue called shaping. The design had
neither a fuselage nor large tail surfaces, virtually
eliminating the reflective edges, corners, and boxy surfaces
that adversely contributed to an aircraft's RCS. [Refs. 1,
3,16]
Signature reduction, or stealth as we know it today,
most probably took its roots as early as the late 1950 's
under the sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). Once it was decided to replace the aging U-2 , the
"Skunk Works" at Lockheed were approached with the prospect
of designing an aircraft with exceptional performance and
remarkably small head-on aspect RCS. The result was the SR-
71 Blackbird whose design featured the elegance and sinister
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shape of a delta wing design with a blended fuselage that
gave it the immunity to threats which it still enjoys
today. The next step was obvious. If a large aircraft,
such as the SR-71, was extremely difficult to detect by
radars, could a smaller aircraft be made virtually
undetectable? In the early 1960's, Firebee target drones
were modified by the Ryan company to fly reconnaissance
missions over China and North Vietnam and these later lead
to the development of larger drones equivalent in size to a
small aircraft. These drones proved to be extremely
difficult to detect during tests in representative dense
threat environments. [Refs. 10,16]
Of significant irony is that by the 1970' s, none of the
stealth aircraft built to date were capable of carrying
ordnance or maneuverable enough to act as a fighter
aircraft. Additionally, the military began to realize that
a large percentage of the aircraft involved in major strikes
during the Vietnam War were not bombers, but support
aircraft tasked with supporting the bombers with jamming,
chaff cloud seeding, and threat suppression with
antiradiation missiles. As a result, Lockheed became even
more deeply involved in stealth technology by designing and
building the first stealth fighter prototype. By the end of
1973, the results of a proof-of-concept project called Have
Blue paved the way for production of the first operationally
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deployed stealth fighters. Unofficially designated the F-
19A, these fighters may be the first tactically deployed
asset completely configured with RCS signature reduction as
one of their primary susceptibility reduction techniques.
[Refs. 7,10,16,22,24]
Soviet defenses, which now include over-the-horizon
(OHT) systems that have extremely long wavelengths, pose
some significant problems even for stealth aircraft. With
these extremely long wavelengths, that are in some instances
approximately the size of the target they are illuminating,
the target itself will act as an antenna no matter what its
shape may be. Thus, even stealth aircraft may be
susceptible. To reduce this problem, special coatings and
materials, such as reinforced carbon fibers were developed
as RAM. The most likely application of this RAM would be to
incorporate sections into the leading and trailing edges of
the wing. [Ref. 16]
Today, aircraft designers have turned to using the RCS
signature reduction techniques of shaping and RAM as a means
of reducing aircraft susceptibility. Although much of the
information on stealth is classified at the highest level,
the significant level of interest in reducing aircraft
susceptibility through RCS signature reduction is not at all
a secret. [Ref. 16,22]
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C. INFRARED SIGNATURE REDUCTION
In the early 1800 's, Sir William Herschel discovered the
existence of an infrared solar radiation band within the
electromagnetic spectrum. Today, some of the most prolific
weapon systems used worldwide are the relatively cheap,
extremely effective, and easily operated infrared
surface/air-to-air missile systems which passively exploit
this band of the electromagnetic spectrum to detect and
track airborne targets. As a measure of their impact,
approximately 90% of all combat aircraft losses over the
past 15 years are attributable to IR missiles. In fact, many
of the historians and political analysts who are commenting
on the recent pull-out of Afghanistan by the Soviets
indicate that a prime reason for the pull-out was the losses
inflicted by IR surface-to-air weapons. These loss
statistics provide a strong incentive for the U.S. military
to build aircraft with significant IR suppression and
countermeasures techniques designed in the aircraft. Since
the mid 1960's, significant studies have been conducted to
better understand and control infrared radiations by various
components of an aircraft, particularly those on rotary wing
aircraft. [Refs. 14,25]
The two major sources of an aircraft's infrared
signature are the propulsion system and the airframe
surface. The relationship between the range at which seeker
lock-on, Rlgt will occur and the aircraft radiant intensity
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is governed by the square root of the aircraft's radiant
intensity. This can be mathematically expressed as
RL0 = [I/(L SMIN (NEFD))]- 5
where I is the aircraft's radiant intensity at the aircraft
in the direction and bandwidth of the IR seeker, L is the
atmospheric losses or attenuation while propagating the
distance Rlq/ SMIN ^s tne minimum signal-to-noise required
for target lock-on, and NEFD is the noise equivalent
irradiance at the seeker that produces a signal equal to the
internal noise. [Ref. 1]
Aircraft propulsion systems produce strong infrared
signatures in a few bands as a result of the large amounts
of C0 2 and H2 in their hot exhaust. Once these hot gases
are expelled from the engine, the atmosphere may scatter,
absorb, or transmit the radiation from the C02 and H 2 0.
Scattering and absorbtion will generally deplete or
attenuate the levels of this emitted radiation. [Refs. 1
and 25]
For both H 2 and C0 2 , the IR bands that have the
greatest absorbtion and emissivity are virtually the same.
Because both these gases are in the jet engine's exhaust
plume, a large amount of energy is radiated in these few
bands. Ideally, the C02 and H2 in the atmosphere would
absorb this radiated energy because of the relationship
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between emission and absorbtion. However, the significant
differences between the pressure and temperature of the
atmosphere and that of the exhaust plume will result in a
difference between the emission and absorbtion characteris-
tics. For example, one primary absorbtion band for
atmospheric C02 is around 4.3 jjs, whereas the C02 from the
jet engine plume is typically between 4.1 to 4.5 ps. Thus,
the majority of the C0 2 will be absorbed by the atmosphere
around 4.3 us, leaving rather large spikes of residual
energy on either side of this band, i.e., 4.1 and 4.5 lis.
This non-absorbed energy is significant because C02 makes up
the majority of the jet engine exhaust plume and the 4.3 u
band is one of the IR bands which passive IR threat systems
can exploit. [Refs. 1,14,25]
One other key factor influencing the absorbtion of both
H 2 and C0 2 is altitude. The relative amounts of each gas
are reduced with altitude, but the concentration of H 2 is
much more drastically affected by altitude. For example,
the amount of H2 present at 20,000 feet is less than 20% of
that at sea level, whereas C02 will have the same relative
concentration at 40,000 feet. These relative concentrations
are also indicators of the relative absorbtion expected at
those altitudes. Thus, at sea level, absorbtion of both
gases is rather extensive; and as altitude increases, the
absorbtion levels for K2 and C02 diminish rapidly, with H2
suffering the most dramatic reduction in absorbtion
34
capability by the atmosphere. Consequently, the lock-on
range goes up as the seeker/aircraft altitude goes up.
[Refs. 1,14,25]
The major contributors to the IR signature of a tactical
jet aircraft are the propulsion and airframe sources that
either emit or reflect infrared energy. The emitted power
is a function of aircraft Mach number, altitude, mission,
the propulsion power setting, and the viewing angle the
threat has of the infrared source. The four most common
methods for reducing an aircraft's infrared signature
include reducing the temperature of the source, the
presented area of the source, and the surface emissivity and
reflectivity of the source. [Refs. 1,14]
The most common techniques used to reduce the
temperature and presented area of the propulsion sources of
an aircraft are to reduce the exhaust plume temperature
through cooling techniques, to cool and/or shield the hot
metal parts, and to apply special coatings to critical metal
components to further enhance the shielding effect. By far
the most difficult item to cool is the engine exhaust plume.
In general, cool ambient air must be mixed with the hot
exhaust plume in order to lower the plume temperature.
Turbojets may use compartment cooling or ambient ram air
pumped into a coannular stream that surrounds the hot core.
For turbofans, the task is much simpler since a readily
available stream of cool air surrounds the hot exhaust gas
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and only needs to be mixed prior to exiting a common nozzle
into the ambient air. Shaping the exhaust from a round
cross section to that of rectangular shape, thereby-
increasing the exhaust tailpipe exit perimeter and
generating vortices enhances mixing with the cooler ambient
air surrounding the plume. A more simplified, but possibly
less effective approach, is to incorporate an angled exhaust
system to direct the hot exhaust at an angle to the flight
path. [Refs. 1,14]
Engine exhaust components, such as the exhaust duct from
the centerbody, the flame holders, the tailpipe, and nozzle
wells, must also be considered in an IR signature reduction
effort. For those components which may be difficult to
cool, such as the turbine blades, shielding can be used to
block the view that a potential infrared bhreat system's
seeker may have of these components. In some cases, a turn
in the exhaust system may be used to achieve this affect.
[Refs. 1,14]
Radiation from airframe sources consists of emissions
due to aerodynamically heated surfaces, hot metal
components, and of reflection of incident radiation, or sun
glint. There is currently no cooling technique available to
reduce or eliminate aerodynamic heating. However, the
impact of surface skin radiation at subsonic flight speeds
on the aircraft's IR signature is considered minimal, and it
is primarily an issue for any aircraft engaged in supersonic
36
flight or any large aircraft flying at both low altitude and
high speed. Hot metal components, such as oil coolers and
heat exchangers, can either be shielded, insulated, or
cooled by flow techniques. Sun glint can be caused by the
shape of the airframe itself and may be solved by using flat
surfaces as opposed to round surfaces; however, this may
negatively impact the efforts to reduce the RCS of the
aircraft. Other techniques, such as the use of infrared
absorbing paint (IRAP) , may offer a better solution.
However, since this paint will absorb incident infrared
radiation, the interior temperature will rise. This
increase in temperature may preclude the use of certain heat
sensitive equipment in those areas where IRAP has been used
or vice versa. [Refs. 1,14]
The key to the IR signature reduction is to design in
the techniques from the beginning, especially when
confronted with a turbojet aircraft. The added weight and
degradation to performance as a result of retrofitting the
nozzles, ejectors, or other cooling hardware may not be
acceptable in terms of the overall susceptibility of the
aircraft. Shaping and painting may be a reasonable retrofit
effort, but some added weight and possible adverse thermal
effects may result. [Ref. 1]
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III. THE U.S. NAVY ATTACK AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT MISSIONS
A. U.S. NAVY MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS
The U.S. Navy's mission, as set forth in Title 10, U.S.
Code, "is to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained
combat operations at sea in support of U. S. national
interests; in effect, to assure continued maritime
superiority for the United States." [Ref. 26:p. 1-3-1] In
support of this mission, the Navy has two primary functions,
sea control and power projection. To accomplish the mission
and these two functions, the Navy has built a naval force
centered around the aircraft carrier. The carrier is
supported by a wide variety of surface, subsurface, and
airborne assets. Each one of these assets is designed for
and tasked with performing specific missions that will both
individually and synergistically fulfill the Navy's mission.
With these forces, the Navy must be able to conduct
sustained operations at sea, with minimal advanced notice.
Specific tasking includes maintaining control of vital sea
lanes, keeping the lines of communication open, and
achieving superiority on land, at sea, and in the air around
those areas of naval operations. To accomplish these tasks,
the Navy must be prepared to conduct operations at sea with
carrier-based aircraft in order to prosecute and destroy
enemy naval and land-based forces. [Ref. 26]
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The two primary functions of sea control and power
projection are very closely related. In order to maintain
sea control, a projection of power may be required.
Conversely, before power may be projected, sea control on,
under, and above the ocean must be achieved. Without one,
the other may not be possible. [Ref. 26]
1. Sea Control
This function is vital for any successful naval
operation during combat. However, simultaneous control of
both the air and the water in the area of operations is not
necessarily required. Thus, sea control is a selective
function that is dependent on the time and scenario and is
exercised when deemed necessary. [Ref. 26]
Sea control is achieved by finding, targeting, and
attacking enemy surface, subsurface, and airborne threats
that could infringe upon the control of an area determined
to be vital to carrying out the Navy's mission. Thus, a
projection of force, using all assets available, will be
used to accomplish these operations. This is referred to as
power projection and may entail the employment of a wide
spectrum of offensive capabilities that include the use of




To either achieve or maintain sea control, power
projection may have to be used. This entails the use of a
variety of assets to destroy enemy naval forces either at
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sea or in their home ports or bases. By preventing the
enemy forces from reaching areas deemed critical for sea
control, maritime superiority is achieved, thereby allowing
friendly forces to access and use sea lanes and airspace
vital to conducting operations against the enemy for
indefinite periods of time. [Ref. 26]
Power projection can be used to strike both land and
sea based targets. In an overland scenario, carrier based
aircraft can be used to strike critical targets well inside
enemy territory as well as other coastal targets. In
conjunction with the aircraft strikes, naval gunfire,
surface-to-surface missile attacks, and/or amphibious
landings may be used to further weaken the enemy's will to
fight. [Refs. 26,27]
B. U.S. NAVY ATTACK AIRCRAFT MISSIONS
The primary functions in support of the Navy's mission,
sea control and power projection, call for the employment of
a wide variety of assets, including carrier-based attack and
fighter aircraft. Today, the Navy's attack aircraft (A-6E,
A-7E, F/A-18) , support aircraft (E-2C, EA-6B) and fighter
aircraft (F-14A, F/A-18) comprise the heart of the carrier's
offensive and defensive operations. The carrier relies
heavily on these assets and those of other surface units to
project the power both in a war-at-sea (WAS) or an overland
scenario. [Refs. 1,26,28]
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The nature of attack aircraft missions do not change
appreciably between the WAS and the overland scenarios.
However, specific tactics used during these missions may
differ, depending on the nature of the target, the defenses,
and possibly the weather.
1. Overland Scenario
Attack aircraft missions associated with an overland
scenario generally require the aircraft to ingress to a
point target or area of interest, deliver the appropriate
ordnance, and return to the aircraft carrier. The exact
mission profile used is directly related to survivability
concerns and may differ radically, depending on the mission
being conducted, the level and sophistication of the
threats, and the support provided by other friendly forces.
The specific ordnance loads and delivery modes are selected
based on several parameters, such as the level of
destruction desired (create a few craters or many small
craters) , the target area weather (use dumb or smart bombs)
,
the type and material composition of the target (hangar or
runway; corrugated steel or concrete) , and the level and
types of threats along both the ingress and egress routes
and in the target area. [Ref. 29]
The specific primary missions for attack aircraft in
an overland scenario against a major power are suppression
of enemy air defense (SEAD) , close air support (CAS)
coordinated long and short range strikes, interdiction,
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armed reconnaissance, and rescue combat air patrol (RESCAP)
.
[Ref. 1]
a. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
The objective of the SEAD mission is to reduce
the attrition of friendly aircraft by attacking SAM or AAA
systems either in advance of, or during a strike. The
mission is usually conducted by specially configured or
equipped aircraft designed to locate, identify, and jam or
physically destroy cooperative ground based enemy air
defense systems that employ sensors that radiate electromag-
netic waves such as a radar. These missions are often
referred to as Iron Hand missions and are carried out by the
Navy's A-7E Corsair II, the F/A-18 Hornet and the EA-6B
ICAP-II Prowler. [Ref. 1]
b. Close Air Support
The CAS mission is designed to assist friendly
ground forces in reaching their objectives by harassing or
conducting other specific actions against enemy forces. It
involves air action against hostile targets that are in
close proximity to friendly forces, requiring detailed
integration of each air mission or sortie with the fire and
movement of these ground forces. The fixed wing aircraft
that conduct this mission are the A-6E Intruder, the A-7E
and the F/A-18. [Refs. 1,28,29]
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c. Coordinated Long and Short Range Strikes
These missions are designed to reduce the
enemy's war making ability and logistics and resupply
capability through the destruction of specific high value
targets. These targets are usually located in heavily
defended areas. Destroying, neutralizing, or delaying enemy
ground forces will severely impair their ability to bear
arms against friendly forces. These missions require the
use of many assets and may be flown over very large
distances. Attack aircraft tasked with this mission are the
A-6E, the A-7E and the F/A-18. [Refs. 1,28,29]
d. Interdiction
Interdiction is designed to destroy, neutralize,
delay, or deny the enemy's potential to conduct operations
in a particular area. This mission consists of attacking
three types of targets selected to control the flow and
operation of the enemy in a particular area. The area may
include a tactical control point (TCP) , a tactical control
area (TCA) and/or a designated target (DT) . A TCP is a
target, such as a road, bridge, or specific point, along a
route the enemy may take. Targets in a TCA may include a
number of TCP targets. For example, to secure an area for
friendly forces to occupy, the destruction of several roads
or bridges may be required. A DT is defined as a specific
target along the enemy's lines of communication, such as a
tank, truck, or convoy. The Navy's attack aircraft that
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perform this mission are the same as those conducting the
coordinated strikes. [Refs. 1,28,29]
e. Armed Reconnaissance
This mission is usually conducted within a
particular area or sector where enemy activity is high. It
entails striking primarily mobile targets of opportunity,
such as trains, shipping, and tanks, and secondarily fixed
targets, such as roads and railways, that are key to the
enemy's operation in that area. Additionally, intelligence,
troop movement, battle force disposition, location, and
total strength may also be gathered during this mission.
Navy attack aircraft used for this mission are the same as
those used to conduct coordinated strikes. [Refs. 1,28,29]
f. RESCAP
This mission uses every asset available to
safely and expediently search for and rescue (SAR) a downed
aircrew. If conducted in a hostile area, the mission is
referred to as combat search and rescue (CSAR) . The fixed
wing attack aircraft used in this mission are the A-7E and
F/A-18. These aircraft are tasked with providing air cover
for the searching helicopter that actually does the rescue.
[Refs. 1,29]
2 . War-at-Sea Scenario
Attack aircraft missions associated with a WAS
scenario are unique in that friendly forces must fly into an
enemy's defenses instead of making every effort to avoid
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them. Furthermore, unlike the overland scenarios, there is
no terrain to mask the ingress to or egress from the target
area. Additionally, the exact location of the enemy naval
forces may be difficult to pinpoint resulting in the attack
aircraft inadvertently flying into the range of their
weapons systems. [Ref. 29]
The objective of a WAS mission is to neutralize
enemy offensive capability, degrade enemy sea worthiness,
and finally sink enemy ships. The attack aircraft missions
in support of WAS scenarios are SEAD, coordinated long and
short range strikes, RESCAP, and surface surveillance
control (SSC)/Bird Dog. With the exception of SSC/Bird Dog
mission, these missions are virtually identical to those
described for the overland scenario, but are conducted over
water. [Refs. 1,29]
a. SSC/Bird Dog
This mission divides an area around the carrier
into smaller specific search areas so that the contacts in
this area can be identified and tracked. Based on time on
station requirements, weather, and sea conditions, a number
of aircraft will be assigned to specific areas to use
onboard sensors and data links to relay requested
information back to the carrier. Location data on hostile
targets located great distances from the task force, often
referred to as over-the-horizon targeting, can also be
performed by these aircraft. The A-6E, A-7E, F/A-18 as well
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as most of the fixed wing and helicopter assets on the
carrier perform this mission. [Refs. 1,29]
3. Attack Aircraft Missions Against a Third World
Nation
In operations against a Third World Nation, the
missions of the attack aircraft for both overland and war-
at-sea scenarios do not appreciably change. The major
differences lie in the amount of territory to be covered,
the numbers and sophistication of that nation's land-based
and sea-based defenses, and the level and length of
operations that are to be conducted against that country.
These operations may be over a long period of time, such as
Vietnam, or over a period of several hours, such as the
April 15, 1986 strike against enemy positions in Lybia.
Although the general mission descriptions do not change, the
tactics used will most probably be adjusted to account for
that country's use of its offensive and defensive assets.
C. U.S. NAVY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT MISSIONS
1 , Overland Scenario
The primary mission of fighter aircraft overland is
to prevent the enemy from engaging friendly aircraft as they
ingress to and egress from the target and to ensure the
target area is free from opposing enemy fighters. Fighters
may support the strike group in a variety of ways, such as
by escorting them, acting in defense roles from standoff
positions, and/or offensively protecting them from patrol
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positions. Some specific missions for fighters include
combat air patrol (CAP) , fighter sweep, strike escort, and
air reconnaissance. [Refs. 1,5]
a. Strike Escort
The objective of this mission is to protect the
strike force attack and support aircraft through a variety
of escort profiles designed to reduce attrition of friendly
aircraft once detected and intercepted by enemy fighters.
The Navy's fighters employed in this role are the F-14A and
the F/A-18. [Ref. 5]
b. Combat Air Patrol
This mission generally assigns fighters to a
specific patrol area for the purpose of intercepting and
destroying hostile aircraft or missiles before they reach
their target. Many of these CAP missions such as MIGCAP,
target CAP (TARCAP) , barrier CAP (BARCAP) , and force CAP
(FORCAP) are specialized, and their specific purpose and
objectives are classified. CAP missions are primarily
conducted by the Navy's F-14A Tomcat and the F/A-18. [Refs.
1,27]
c. Fighter Sweep
This mission is the dedication of the fighter
aircraft to protect or defend attack and support aircraft
through the offensive tactic of seeking out and destroying
enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in an allotted area
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of operation. The Navy's fighters that are employed in this
role are the F-14A and the F/A-18. [Refs. 1,5]
d. Aerial Reconnaissance
The objective of this mission is to obtain
photography of high interest activity or targets. Specific
objectives may be bomb damage assessment (BDA) , target
photography, or to gather information on enemy activity.
The only aircraft in the U.S. Navy's inventory capable of
this mission is the tactical air reconnaissance pod system




Fighters in a WAS scenario are primarily dedicated
to the maritime air superiority (MAS) mission. The specific
details and descriptions of the MAS missions are classified.
[Refs. 27,30]
3 Fighter Missions Against a Third World Nation
The same differences and scope of operations for the
attack aircraft apply to the fighter aircraft in this type
of scenario.
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IV. THREAT SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND SCENARIOS
Since World War II, the emphasis on improving air
defense systems has generated an abundance of highly complex
and widely used weapon systems that pose serious threats to
tactical aircraft. The tremendous improvements in radar,
optical, and IR detecting and tracking methods, missile
performance, projectile velocities, and enemy fighter
aircraft performance dictate necessary improvements to
existing and future friendly attack and fighter aircraft.
Thus, an appreciation of threat system capabilities,
complexities, and design is necessary to understand the
emphasis on increased performance and signature reduction
for future attack and fighter aircraft. [Refs. 1,31]
A. THREAT TERMINOLOGY
The threats to an aircraft have been defined as those
elements of a man-made nature designed to reduce the flying
ability of an aircraft resulting in its inability to perform
mission related functions. This is accomplished by
employing threat systems designed to inflict damage to an
aircraft that either degrades or even destroys the aircraft
or by intimidating the pilot into maneuvers that may
increase his survivability, but impair his ability to
successfully accomplish his objective. [Ref. 1]
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In order to survive in an area of hostile air defense
threat systems, a thorough knowledge of the threat systems
capabilities, location, operational status, and the
aircraft's capabilities against them is reguired. Aircraft
capabilities cover multitude of options, such as electronic
countermeasures (ECM) , tactics with increased aircraft
performance, signature reduction or any combination thereof.
[Ref. 1]
The principal categories that make up the threat topical
field include threat characteristics, operations, and
lethality. Threat characteristics refer to the types of
threat, threat platform, and propagators used, as well as a
description of the warhead. Threat operations refer to the
environmental factors and firing or launching capabilities
of the threat system, such as its mobility, locational
adaptability, and weather capability, as well as the
system's slew rate, rate of fire, and target intercept
envelope. Threat lethality refers to those factors relating
to fire control, propagator trajectory, and the terminal
effects parameters of the threat in the process of
directing, projecting, and activating one or more damage
mechanisms designed to adversely affect the target. [Ref.
1]
With all the categories defined, a generic system
mounted on a tracked vehicle might be characterized as an
all-weather, highly mobile, terminal threat surface-to-air
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missile system equipped with a supersonic, high "G," command
guided missile armed with a proximity fuze and a 400 lb
high-explosive (HE) fragmentation warhead.
1. Surface-to-Air Missile Threats
This particular type of threat, which can be land-
or sea-based, is used to launch and guide missiles against
airborne targets. The specific launch and guidance
equipment varies in size from a single hand-held launch tube
to a semi-permanent complex of a variety of trailers, vans,
and launch units. [Ref. 1]
SAM systems ranges vary from very short, such as a
shoulder fired weapon, to extremely long ranges, as in the
case of the Soviet's SA-4 SAM system. In most instances,
the enemy will select and locate the SAMs in an attempt to
develop the overlapping coverage needed to provide the
ground or naval forces with adequate air defense. [Refs. 1,
13]
The initial deployment of the early SAM systems was
to fixed positions due to their immobility. The equipment
was rather cumbersome, heavy, and required dedicated on-site
maintenance. An example was the U.S. Army's Nike Hercules
SAM system. Today, with the emergence of computers and
extremely fast and reliable digital equipment, much of the
bulk and weight have been reduced, resulting in a tremendous
increase in system mobility. [Ref. 1]
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SAM systems today generally include a dedicated
radar for tracking both the missile and the target aircraft.
They are normally provided target location information from
early warning (EW) and target acquisition (TA) radars. The
EW and TA family of radars have very long maximum target
detection ranges, but they generally have relatively poor
aircraft tracking accuracy due to their lower radio
frequencies (RF) and pulse repetition frequencies (PRF)
,
wide beamwidths, and long pulse widths necessary for
achieving these long ranges. [Ref. 1]
The target tracking radar (TTR) nominally operates
at a relatively high radio frequency, with high PRF's to
increase data rates, a small pulse width to improve range
resolution for closely spaced targets, and a narrow
beamwidth to improve azimuth resolution. Thus, SAM TTRs can
be categorized as relatively short ranged, high data rate
radars with good target tracking accuracy and resolution
tailored to the missile performance and warhead
capabilities. [Ref. 1]
Missile guidance is achieved using either a
dedicated missile guidance radar or the target tracking
radar. A given SAM system may use several types of guidance
to conduct an intercept. For most anti-aircraft
applications, missile guidance types include command, beam
rider, homing, and retransmission. [Ref. 1]
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Command guided missiles are those whose guidance
instructions or commands originate from sources outside the
missile. By using a device, such as a flare or a radar
beacon on the missile, to track the missile and a target
tracking system using radar, optics, infrared, or lasers to
track the target aircraft, appropriate guidance commands may
be transmitted to the missile based on target and aircraft
ranges, elevations, and bearings. Additionally, information
such as fuzing, arming, and warhead detonation may also be
passed using this up link. SAM systems using command
guidance include the French Crotale, the British Rapier and
Soviet land-based SA-2 , 3, 4, and 8 and sea-based SA-N-3 and
4 systems. [Ref. 1]
Beam rider missiles use a rearward-facing antenna in
the missile to sense the target tracker's signal. By using
onboard equipment to determine its position in the TTR's
beam, corrections can be calculated and sent to the control
surfaces to keep the missile as nearly as possible in the
center of the target tracking radar's beam or scanning axis.
Since tracking errors for this system relate directly to
target tracking accuracy and the TTR's beamwidth, these
systems are generally restricted to short ranges. SAM
systems using this type of guidance are the British Seaslug,
the U. S. Navy's Talos and Terrier system, and the RBS-70,
which uses a laser for target tracking. [Ref. 1]
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Homing guidance SAM systems comprise three major
types: active, semiactive, and passive. They all use a
specially configured missile which homes in on electromag-
netic energy coming from the target aircraft. The original
source of the energy may come from the missile itself
(active homing) , from a target illuminating radar
(semiactive homing) , or from the target aircraft itself
(passive homing) . SAM systems using homing guidance include
the U.S. Navy's Sea Sparrow, Standard and Tartar systems,
and the U.S. Army's Chaparral, Hawk, Redeye, and Stinger
systems, and the Soviet's SA-6, 7 and 9 systems. [Refs. 1,
5,9]
Retransmission guidance is a combination of both
command and homing guidance techniques. It is also referred
to as track-via-missile (TVM) and is the latest technique
developed for guiding missiles to an airborne target. This
system typically uses a vastly improved and modernized
generation of TTRs designed to track both the target and the
missile, illuminate the target, and receive relative target
angular position data from the missile. The SAM system then
uses computers on the ground to calculate guidance commands
for transmission to the missile by the target tracking
radar. This closed loop method of guidance allows for
tracking and engaging several targets simultaneously. [Ref.
1]
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The surface-to-air missiles contain an ordnance
package consisting of a fuzed warhead. The fuze package
consists of safety and arming devices, a detonator, and a
target detecting device (TDD) . Fuzing or charge detonation
may be accomplished by contact with or proximity to the
target. Contact fuzes detonate on or shortly after contact
is made with the target and proximity fuzes, often referred
to as VT (variable time) fuzing, detonate at some distance
from the target aircraft based upon the fuze logic and
relative location and motion of the target aircraft. The
TDD can be passive, active, or semiactive depending on the
nature of the SAM system or the target. [Refs. 1,5]
The types of high-explosive warheads used in these
missiles are either blast or pressure, fragmentation,
continuous rod, or shaped charge warheads. The primary
damage mechanisms causing the damage processes and terminal
effects to the aircraft are fragments and to a lesser degree
blast. [Refs. 1,5]
2 . Surface-to-Air Guns
These land- or sea-based systems vary in size from
small caliber shoulder fired guns, commonly referred to as
small arms, to rather large fixed site systems, referred to
as AAA. Specifically, small arms are those guns that fire
projectiles up to and including 20mm in diameter, while AAA
fire projectiles greater than 20mm. The primary propagator
for these systems is a projectile propelled initially by an
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applied exterior force that continues its motion by virtue
of its own inertia. These projectiles contain an ordnance
package consisting of a warhead that is either fuzed, when
the warhead has an HE charge, or nonfuzed. The operation of
the fuzed warhead is similar to that described for the
missiles, but guns include a third type of warhead referred
to as the timed-fuzed warhead. The timed-fuzed warhead is
set to detonate at a predetermined time following firing.
The nonfuzed warhead is a penetrator or kinetic energy
penetrator designed to cause damage to the aircraft upon
contact. [Ref. 1]
The type of projectile determines its damaging
effects. Projectiles fired by gun systems are of the ball
(B) , armor-piercing (AP) , armor-piercing-incendiary (AP-I)
,
and high-explosive type. [Ref. 1]
Generally, the composition and mobility of a gun is
a function of the projectile size. AAA systems firing
projectiles under 57mm are considered to be extremely mobile
for the same reasons SAMs are and are usually widely
dispersed throughout an air defense zone. The vast majority
of AAA systems consist of several guns, tracking radars or
optical devices, associated interface equipment, and
projectiles. [Ref. 1]
The range of AAA systems varies with caliber. For
example, the 2 3mm AAA systems are credited with tactical
ranges of 1500-2500 meters while the 57mm AAA systems are
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given a capability out to 6000 meters. Larger caliber AAA
systems benefit from increased range, but at the expense of
rate of fire. [Ref. 1]
The AAA systems are provided target location
information from EW and TA radars for the same reasons SAM
radars are. The majority of AAA systems track the target by
radar or optical means and use computers to determine a
firing solution. Unlike the SAM systems, a guidance or
target illuminating radar is not required. However, a few
AAA systems today incorporate sophisticated target tracking
radars that allow them to accurately track both the target
and the projectile with extremely good accuracy. [Ref. 1]
3 . Fighter Aircraft
These assets are a class of high-performance
aircraft designed to engage and destroy airborne targets.
Weapons systems employed by fighter aircraft include air-
to-air guns and missiles, and associated equipment for
identifying, tracking, and firing the weapons. [Ref. 1]
The range of tactical fighters varies directly with
mission requirements, payload, and tanker aircraft
availability. Considerable advance in computer controlled
flight controls, sophisticated electronics, and weapons have
vastly improved fighter effectiveness over the past decade.
However, the most severe limitation to these assets is time
on station, fuel requirements, and limited numbers of
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aircraft and ordnance when compared to the ground defenses.
[Ref. 1]
Normally fighter aircraft are given vectors to the
enemy aircraft by controllers using either a ground
controlled intercept (GCI) radar or an airborne command and
control aircraft, such as the U.S. Navy's E-2C Hawkeye
aircraft. Fighter aircraft then acquire the target using
their onboard sensors or visually. The fighter may either
prosecute the target in an air-to-air missile engagement
and/or an air-to-air gun attack. The air-to-air missiles
and guns operate similarly to their land-based counterparts
with the exception of the launch or firing origin. [Ref. 1]
4 . Lethality
Threat lethality, as it pertains to land- or sea-
based SAMs and guns, or air-to-air missiles and guns, is
used to refer to the collection of factors that relate to
the fire control, the propagator trajectory, and the
terminal effects parameters. [Ref. 1]
Fire control factors consist of the types of fire
control, the types of coverage, and the types of errors.
Types of fire control range from an open sight on small arms
and light AAA to an on-mount optical or mechanical lead
computing sight to a radar or electro-optical system
employed on the larger caliber AAA systems. The types of
coverage are aimed fire at a specific target, sector
intercept for defense of a sector of the air space, or
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barrage fire for general coverage of the air space. Fire
control errors encompass tracking errors, aiming errors,
lead angle prediction errors, and jitter. Tracking errors
are introduced by the threat system's inability to
accurately provide an exact record of the aircraft flight
path. Aiming errors are introduced during the firing or
launching phase due to the system's inability to correctly
position or aim the appropriate equipment in the desired
direction. Lead angle prediction errors result from
unexpected target maneuvers during the flight time of the
projectile or guided missile. Jitter is produced by the
synergistic effects of aiming and tracking errors resulting
from rough motion of the weapon system or atmospheric
effects. [Ref. 1]
Trajectory factors relate to or influence the
missile or projectile path to the aircraft and can be
divided into those associated with nonguided and guided
propagators. The trajectories of nonguided propagators,
such as ballistic projectiles, are affected by gravity drop,
ballistic dispersion, and the ballistic coefficient.
Gravity drop is caused by the gravitational force on the
projectile. Ballistic dispersion is caused by the scatter
of the impact points due to differences in weight and
surface variations, burning efficiencies, and aerodynamic
forces on the projectile. The ballistic coefficient
accounts for the attenuation in velocity of the projectile
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or fragment in transit to the target. Guided propagators
are primarily guided missiles whose trajectory is controlled
by a guidance package that uses either command guidance,
beam-rider guidance, homing guidance and/or retransmission
guidance as previously discussed. [Ref. 1]
Missile guidance can be further divided into three
phases: boost or launch, which lasts from launch till the
booster fuel supply is exhausted; the mid-course phase,
which is usually the longest phase in both duration and
distance, where course adjustments are made and updated; and
the terminal phase which must be the most accurate and rapid
to compensate for the dynamic end game. [Ref. 1]
Missile guidance systems are extremely complex and
incorporate a balance of guidance types during the three
phases to ensure an optimum trajectory is flown. The
trajectories are determined by any one of several methods or
laws of navigation. The four most common methods are
pursuit, lead angle, three point, and proportional
navigation. A pursuit trajectory maintains as course by
which the missile flies directly toward the target at all
times and can be easily thought of as a dog chasing a
rabbit. Lead angle trajectory flies the missile on a
constant bearing closing range course that results in an
eventual intercept with the aircraft. In three-point
guidance, the missile is constantly being steered to lie on
the line between the target tracking radar and the target
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aircraft and is most often used in systems employing command
to line of sight (CLOS) or beam rider guidance. Proportion-
al Navigation (Pro Nav) is a common method for changing
missile heading to cause a target intercept. This is
accomplished by attempting to maintain an essentially
constant line of sight (LOS) angle by making the rate of
change of the missile heading proportional to the rate of
change of the LOS. [Ref. 1]
Terminal effects parameters relate to the inherent
capability of the damage mechanism to cause damage to a
target aircraft. As an example, the terminal effects
parameters associated with a blast generated fragment are
the fragment's weight and velocity at impact. [Ref. 1]
B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
The scenario is a specific description of the many
parameters that characterize an encounter between one or
more aircraft and the hostile air defensive forces. Key to
the scenario are the aircraft flight path(s) and
altitudes (s) , the number, type, location, employment and
operational status of the threats, the environmental and
meteorological conditions, and the type of terrain along the
ingress, egress, and at the target itself. [Ref. 1]
The following overland and WAS scenarios are generic in
nature, but with subtle changes in the variety and
sophistication of the threats, the numbers and deployment
status of those threats, and the tactics and employment
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doctrine or philosophy in use, they could represent a
scenario against any nation.
1. Overland Scenario
Once the target is either selected or mandated, a
decision on the type and amount of ordnance to be used is
made. This decision drives the number of attack aircraft
that will be used and must be carefully weighed since
exposure of the minimum number of aircraft to the enemy's
defenses is desired. Parallel to the ordnance planning is
the support package planning which focuses exclusively on
reducing the strike group's susceptibility to the threats.
Decisions on how many jammer aircraft are needed, jamming
priorities, and orbit points are made to counter the enemy
ground based and airborne threats. Additionally, enemy
fighters can pose significant threats to bomb laden attack
aircraft and must be neutralized through the use of friendly
fighters. Fighter missions (MIGCAP, BARCAP, etc.) are
determined, as are the weapons configurations and fuel
requirements. Command, control and communications aircraft
complete the support package, and decisions with respect to
appropriate radio communication and data link frequencies,
as well as individual aircraft codes for identification and
deconfliction purposes are made.
Once the strike group launches, the attack aircraft
and support aircraft execute their missions with enroute
decisions made real time, providing the flexibility required
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to account for any unexpected or unplanned events that might
occur during the strike. Attack aircraft loaded with their
ordnance ingress to the target, possibly at low altitude to
avoid initial detection by the enemy's long range early
warning radars. Support aircraft loaded with jamming
equipment and anti-radiation missiles attempt to neutralize
the enemy's ground based SAM and AAA sites, as well as the
critical command and control networks used to control enemy
fighters. Terrain is used to mask the attack aircraft from
exposure to threat systems until near the target area, where
appropriate pop-up maneuvers may be employed to acquire the
target. Self-protection equipment onboard the attack
aircraft may be used to attempt to neutralize remaining
threat systems during the attack phase. Once the ordnance
is on target, the strike group may egress high or low,
depending on the threats present. Friendly fighters
continue to "delouse" the strike group on egress, ensuring
enemy fighters are engaged and neutralized before they can
achieve a kill against one or more of the attack aircraft.
Command and control aircraft that have overseen the entire
evolution continue to provide critical "big picture"
information, as well as specific information to the attack
and support aircraft, maximizing their mutual support. Once
safely out of the enemy's air defenses, the attack aircraft
will climb to their optimum altitude and return to the
carrier along with the fighter and support aircraft.
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2 . War-At-Sea Scenario
This scenario differs markedly from the overland
scenario with respect to the ingress and egress. Unlike the
overland scenario, this scenario has very predictable
ingress and egress routes that are normally threat free.
However, unique to this scenario is the requirement to have
very accurate targeting information since the targets are
usually always on the move.
Once the targets are assigned, the enemy surface
units are studied carefully to assess their offensive
capabilities against the carrier task force and their air
defense capabilities. The optimum ordnance loads are
selected, and the numbers of attack and support aircraft and
missions are fixed. Fighter aircraft are most often used as
part of the defensive posture assumed by the carrier task
force during these operations.
Depending on the location of the enemy forces, the
attack aircraft will fly a profile to minimize their
exposure to the threat. Command and control aircraft will
once again provide the "big picture" to the strike group to
maximize coordination. Similar to the overland scenario,
support aircraft equipped with anti-radiation missiles and
jamming equipment will attempt to roll back the defenses and
decrease the attack aircraft's susceptibility. However,
ultimately they will need to enter the threat envelopes of
the enemy's air defenses. Attack aircraft onboard ECM
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equipment will be used to degrade the enemy's air defenses.
After the ordnance is delivered, egress to the carrier will
be at optimum altitude ensuring maximum survivability.
65
V. SUSCEPTIBILITY ASSESSMENT
A. DEFINITION OF SUSCEPTIBILITY
Susceptibility refers to the inability of an aircraft to
avoid being damaged by one or more damage mechanisms in the
pursuit of its mission. The degree of susceptibility is
dependent on the threat, the scenario, and the aircraft
itself. [Ref. 1]
Susceptibility can be measured by PH , where P^
represents the product of several conditional probabilities
that are a function of a particular scenario. For a typical
SAM engagement, these may include the probability the threat
is active, PA , the probability the aircraft can be detected,
identified and tracked, ?DIT' anc* tne probability of a
successful missile launch, guidance to an intercept, and
warhead detonation, Plgd* Thus, PH can be written in the
form
PH = PA PDIT PLGD- [ Ref - *J
Each one of the probabilities may be influenced by one
or more susceptibility reduction features, often referred to
as countermeasures. Lately, the emphasis on counter-measures
development has received a great deal of attention that is
directly related to the intensity of, and needs generated
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by, recent military operations. Unfortunately, the
development and production of countermeasures has tended to
lag the development of air-defense weapons. However,
through the recent lessons learned in the Southeast Asia
conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the Falklands,
countermeasures are now a major consideration for
survivability enhancement in the early design phases of an
aircraft. [Ref. 1]
B. SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION FEATURES
Susceptibility reduction features include a wide variety
of countermeasures designed to impact primarily radar,
infrared, and visually guided threat systems. The majority
of these features involve some piece of eguipment, device,
or armament that is carried by the attacking aircraft for
self-protection or by another special purpose aircraft
tasked with supporting the attacking aircraft. These
features are grouped into the six the concepts of threat
warning, noise jammers and deceivers, signature reduction,
expendables, threat suppression, and tactics. [Ref. 1]
Specific applications of these features or counter-
measures have been developed for the important portions of
the electromagnetic spectrum (radar, infrared and visual)
and are normally employed for their synergistic degrading
effect on enemy air defense systems. The words passive and
active are sometimes used to further describe these
countermeasure techniques. Passive refers to any technique
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that does not require any action that would alert the enemy
as to the presence of the aircraft. Active, on the other
hand, will in most cases compromise the aircraft's position
or intent. For example, threat warning and signature
reduction are considered passive concepts, whereas noise
jammers and deceivers, expendables, and threat suppression
countermeasures are usually considered to be active
susceptibility reduction concepts. [Ref. 1]
Susceptibility reduction techniques are most effective
when used together as complimentary systems to improve the
overall net effect. A brief description of each concept and
its role with the other concepts will emphasize this point.
1. Threat Warning
Knowledge of the location, type, and status of the
threat systems in the vicinity of the aircraft is vital to
aircraft survivability. With this information, the pilot
could perform an evasive maneuver timed with the delivery of
the proper expendable and jamming or deceiving to generate
significant errors into the threat system's fire control
system resulting in increased miss distances. Thus, with
proper warning a combination of several appropriate active
and passive techniques can significantly improve the
probabilities of survival. [Refs. 1,5,9]
Several types of threat warning systems are needed
to adequately warn the pilot to the danger of any
combination of radar, infrared, and visually guided threat
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systems. However, the majority of the threat warning
systems in use today are designed to detect only the
presence of radar signals associated with SAM, AAA, and
airborne threat systems. The two major types of threat
warning systems are radar warning receivers and radar homing
and warning receivers. These systems can provide vital
information, such as threat location relative to the
aircraft, threat type, and status (searching, tracking,
illuminating, or actively guiding the missile) . This
information may be displayed to the pilot on a cathode-ray
tube (CRT) or through aural warbling tones in headsets or
helmets. [Refs. 1,5,9]
Advances in technology have provided the ability to
program threat warning systems through software to respond
to only those threats stored in the memory. This is
extremely useful when trying to match the radar warning
requirements to the mission of a particular aircraft. As an
example, a low flying attack aircraft may not concern itself
with certain surveillance or early warning radars, but
aircraft tasked with threat suppression or stand-off jamming
may require this type of information. [Refs. 1,9]
Aircrew workload is extremely high in most combat
scenarios and results in increased pilot reaction times when
confronted with having to make split-second decisions, such
as those needed to correctly respond to today's advanced
threat systems. Consequently, many of today's electronic
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countermeasures systems incorporate a power management
processor which allows the RWR or RHAW equipment to allocate
jamming resources and expendables to priority targets, point
any steerable jamming antennas, optimize jamming by
selecting the appropriate jamming modulation, and tune
jammers to match the measured radar characteristics.
Additionally, power management can maximize jamming
effectiveness by controlling the jamming duty cycle as well
as provide for the simultaneous jamming of several radars in
succession through the use of time-gated noise. [Refs. 1,
5,9]
2 . Noise Jammers and Deceivers
Onboard or stand-off active electronic equipment
designed to degrade the effectiveness of various terminal
and nonterminal threat systems is considered critical for
aircraft survivability. Onboard equipment used for
defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) against threat
systems is usually referred to as a self-screening or self-
protection jammers, such as the U.S. Navy's ALQ-165 airborne
self-protection jammer (ASPJ) . Larger, more capable
offboard equipment can be carried either by a drone or a
special purpose aircraft, such as the U.S. Navy's EA-6B
aircraft. [Refs. 1,5,9]
There are two primary radiation emission techniques
used to reduce an aircraft's susceptibility. These are
noise or denial jamming and deception jamming. Noise/denial
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jamming may be thought of as a "brute force" method designed
to hide an aircraft's radar echo. Deception jamming is more
complex and uses transmitted signals that are designed to
confuse or fool the particular threat system radar and not
necessarily overpower it, hence the difference between the
two techniques. These two techniques are primarily used
against radars. However, there are devices designed to jam
or deceive other portions of the electromagnetic spectrum,
such as the infrared. [Refs. 1,9]
Radar noise jamming consists of generating a noise-
like signal with the characteristics of the victim radar
that has sufficient energy to mask the aircraft's radar echo
presented to the radar operator on the CRT. The majority of
the noise used is continuous wave (CW) and may be generated
using a variety of techniques. The most common of these
techniques are broadband or barrage jamming, spot jamming,
and swept jamming. Broadband or barrage jamming is
primarily used against a radar whose exact operating
frequency is changing or agile. This technique may also be
used to cover the operating frequencies of more than one
radar. Spot jamming is relatively narrow in its frequency
coverage and is used against radars whose frequency is
known. Spot jamming uses a bandwidth sufficiently wide
enough to cover the victim radar's operating frequency range
and is centered at the center of its operating bandwidth.
Swept jamming is the rapid, repetitive sweeping of a narrow
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bandwidth noise signal across the bandwidth of the victim
radar and is sometimes used in place of barrage jamming.
[Refs. 1,9]
There are two parameters used to determine the
effect of noise jamming on a particular radar system. These
are the jam-to-signal ratio (J/S) and the burn-through
range, RB . J/S is the ratio of the power of the noise
intercepted by the victim radar's receiver to the power of
the aircraft's return echo. The power of the noise
generated by the jammer, J, may be represented as
J = Pj B Gj
where Pj is the jammer power density, B is the bandwidth of
the radar receiver, and Gj is the gain of the jammer antenna
in the direction of the victim radar. [Ref. 1]
The power of the echo, S, at the target is given by
S = (Pr Gr <r)/(4ir R 2 )
where Pr is the radar power, Gr is the radar's antenna gain,
is the radar cross section of the target aircraft and R is
the aircraft's range from the radar. [Ref. 1]
Dividing J by S will give the J/S ratio at the
target and also at the radar receiver for a self-screening
situation, and can be mathematically represented as
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J/S = (Pj B Gj 4ir R2 )/(Pr Gr 0). [Ref. 1]
Burn-through range is the distance from the victim
radar at which the target aircraft's radar echo is stronger
than the level of jamming present. This can be explained by
looking at the J and S equations for an aircraft approaching
a particular threat system. As the aircraft range
decreases, S becomes larger while J is unaffected. Thus, J
is essentially constant, whereas S is inversely proportional
to the square of the range of the target aircraft from the
victim radar. By defining the minimum J/S ratio as that
required to barely mask the target aircraft, and expressing
it as a "camouflage factor," C, the burn-through range can
be mathematically expressed as
RB =[(Pr Gr a C)/(Pj B Gj 4ir)]- 5#
It is important to note that there is not a single value for
RB since the fluctuation in a and jammer antenna gain, Gj
,
occur continuously in any typical scenario. [Ref. 1]
Noise jamming may also be provided by dedicated
aircraft in a supporting role. These supporting aircraft
normally operate at distances from both the target aircraft
and the victim radar that are outside the range of enemy air
defenses. Inherent advantages to stand-off jammers are the
simultaneous protection of several aircraft, higher power,
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one or more directional antenna, profile optimization to
maximize the jammer-to-radar propagation factor,
neutralization of home-on-jam tracking, increased asset
availability, and concealment of precise direction to the
attack aircraft. Disadvantages are the requirement for high
jamming power to achieve a desired J/S at these stand-off
ranges, difficulty in providing sufficient protection by
remaining behind the strike group, and the potential to be
targeted as a high value target whose loss will severely
impact attack aircraft survivability. [Refs. 1,9]
Equations for calculating J/S ratios and burnthrough
ranges for stand-off noise jammers can be derived in a
similar manner as those for the self-protection jammer, but
must account for the fact that the jammer and target
aircraft are not collocated. Thus, the J/S ratio for stand-
off noise jammers can be given in the form
J/S = (Pj B Gj r Grj 47T Rt4 )/(Pr Gr Gr (T Rj 2 )
where R^ is the radar to target range, Rj is the radar to
jammer range, Gj r is the gain of the jammer antenna in the
direction of the radar, and Grj is the gain of the radar
antenna in the direction of the jammer. Burn-through range
for a stand-off jammer is obtained by setting J/S = C and
solving that equation for Rt. Thus, RB for the stand-off
jammer can be expressed as
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RB = (Pr Gr 2 a C Rj 2/Pj B Gj r Gr j 4ir)' 25 . [Ref.l]
Many factors play heavily in the operational
employment of a jamming system. These include types and
numbers of jammers, prioritization of jamming targets,
frequencies to be jammed, selection of optimum jamming
modulations to be used, and jammer on and off times. To
further enhance a jammers effectiveness, most jamming
systems either use the RWR or RHAW equipment or some type of
"look-through" scheme to gain up-to-date information about
the radars to be jammed such as frequency changes, radar on
and off modes, and relative bearing to the threat system.
[Refs. 1,9]
Deception jammers are considered "smart" jammers
whose purpose is to deceive or fool a particular threat
system by introducing into the victim radar false target
information. This type of jamming may be done against both
radar and infrared systems. The general approach to
deception jamming is to overload the victim radar by
generating a large number of false targets indistinguishable
from the real targets and/or provide erroneous target
bearing, range, or velocity information to the victim radar.
[Refs. 1,5,9]
Deception jammers use a great many techniques, such
as range-gate-pull-off (RGPO) and inverse con-scan. RGPO
superimposes the deceiving pulse onto the actual target
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echo, increases the intensity of the superimposed pulse to a
level sufficient to capture the victim radar's automatic
gain control (AGC) , and either delays or advances the now
stronger deceiving pulse to move the range gate off the
actual target echo. Once the AGC circuit has been captured
and the range gate has been moved off the actual target, the
deceiving pulse may be shut off, leaving the range gate
without a target in it and requiring the victim radar to
reacquire the target. [Refs. 1,9]
Inverse con-scan is an amplitude modulation
technique used to deceive conical scan tracking radars.
This technique uses passive techniques to determine both the
scan rate of the radar and when the scanning beam is
closest to the aircraft. With this data, it then transmits
a very strong deceiving pulse in synchronization with the
scan rate, but timed such that the stronger deceiving pulse
is transmitted when the victim radar's scanning beam is
pointed away from the actual target. As the scanning beam
approaches the aircraft, the deceiving pulse is turned off.
The net effect is that the victim radar will interpret the
inverse modulation pattern to mean the aircraft is in the
direction of the deceiving pulse. [Refs. 1,9]
Infrared jammers and deceivers are devices designed
to introduce large amounts of infrared noise into an
infrared tracking system or to fool these systems by
introducing false target information. The principles by
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which these devices work are similar to their radar
counterparts. [Ref. 1]
3 . Signature Reduction
A threat system's ability to quickly detect, locate,
identify, and accurately track an airborne target will have
a direct bearing on its survivability. Reducing aircraft
signatures can severely degrade the ability of a threat
system to accomplish these functions. Currently, major
contributors to an aircraft's overall signature are the
radar cross section, its infrared radiation, and the visual
and acoustic signatures. The two general methods used to
reduce an aircraft's signature are to reduce the aircraft
signature to a level below sensor threshold and to mask the
aircraft's signature by minimizing the aircraft-to-
background contrast. [Ref. 1]
Radar signature reduction is specifically designed
to reduce the level of the signature by reflection, absorb-
tion, or active interference with surface currents. The
objective of reflection is to reflect the radar signal away
from the receiving antenna. For most monostatic radar
systems, where the transmitting and receiving antenna are
collocated, knowledge of the radar's receiver location is
not necessary since the received direction is all that is
required. However, for bistatic radars, where the transmit
and receive antennas are not collocated, information on the
location of the radar's receiver antenna is required.
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Absorbtion of the impinging radar signal is accomplished
using specially designed radar absorbing materials called
RAM. RAM can "absorb" the echo either by admitting and then
internally attenuating the strength of the impinging signal,
or by internally generating reflections that interfere with
the reflection from the front surface. Interference with
the surface currents is a method used for countering radars
whose wavelength is approximately the same or longer than
the scattering surface of the aircraft. This is accom-
plished by introducing impedances at various key locations
over the aircraft surface that normally create high RCS
signatures. [Refs. 1,16,22]
Infrared signature reduction is a method to control
the level of infrared signature presented to a threat
system. This is accomplished by reduction of the
temperature, reduction or masking of the observable
radiating area, reduction of the surface emissivity, and
reduction of surface reflectivity. [Refs. 1,10,14]
Visual signature reduction is based on minimizing
the contrast between the aircraft and the background with
respect to luminance, chromaticity, clutter, and movement.
The areas receiving the majority of attention are the engine
exhaust and glow, the glint off the canopy, the airframe
signature, and the aircraft lighting. [Ref. 1]
Aural signature is the only important signal not in
the electromagnetic radiation spectrum. This type of
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reduction may be accomplished by acoustic power reduction,
spectrum shaping, shielding and absorbtion. Examples of
acoustic noise reduction for propeller and rotor blades
include increasing the numbers of blades and their diameter,
decreasing tip velocities, decreasing shaft horsepower, or
through phase cancellation in multipropellor aircraft.
Spectrum shaping during the conceptual design phase of the
aircraft may allow for shaping the noise at frequencies
where the human ear is less sensitive. Shielding may
require a physical boundary be placed in the path of the
noise while absorbing materials, such as fiberglass batting
or open-cell polyurethane that absorb incident acoustic
energy, might be placed around critical components. [Refs.
1,10]
Other signatures that pose significant potential
problems for tactical aircraft are the inadvertent or
deliberate active electromagnetic emissions which become
sources for detection, tracking, and home-on-jam.
Inadvertent emissions include emissions from equipment
placed in a standby status that are not sufficiently
shielded to prevent extraneous noise from emitting from
those systems. Active emissions include radars for
navigation and weapons, radar altimeters, radio
communications, and active countermeasures, such as jammers
and deceivers. [Refs. 1,9]
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4 . Expendables
Expendables are widely used in tactical aircraft due
to their relative low cost, ease of operation, and generic
effect. Expendables can be used for self-protection or for
the mutual support of many aircraft. They are designed for
the purpose of denying or deceiving threat systems for a
short period of time. For optimal effectiveness, the
signature of the aircraft employing expendables must be
carefully examined to ensure the expendable's signature is
larger than the aircraft's. [Ref. 1]
Expendables come in many forms such as chaff,
retroreflectors, aerosols, and flares. Chaff was first
developed for use in WWII by the British to confuse German
air defense radars. Chaff consists of dipoles tailored to
the needs of the user by "cutting" them to exhibit a radar
return or backscatter cross section matching those of the
victim radar's wavelength. The magnitude of the backscatter
is dependent upon the orientation of these dipoles with
respect to the illuminating radar. Chaff can be dispensed
individually for self-protection purposes or in bulk,
generating a cloud designed to protect several aircraft.
Depending on what frequencies are to be jammed or deceived,
the chaff may be cut into long ropes for longer radar
wavelengths or put into small bundles for the shorter
wavelengths. [Refs. 1,9]
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Chaff is used against a wide variety of radars
ranging from early warning and GCI to missile, SAM, and AAA
target tracking radars. Critical to its effectiveness is
the bloom time. Whether for creating chaff corridors, chaff
clouds, or self-protection purposes, chaff should be
dispensed into turbulent air. This will serve to place the
chaff and the aircraft in the same range bin of the victim
radar. If this does not happen, the radar may not "see" the
chaff and will continue to track the target. Its effective-
ness is also dependent on aircraft maneuvering subseguent to
deployment, radar type, and any electronic counter
countermeasures (ECCM) employed by the radar. If the radar
is a pulse-Doppler type or one that employs an ECCM
technigue such as moving target indicator (MTI) signal
processing, the chaff's intended effect may be negated since
these radars eliminate stationary targets from the
operator's scope, such as ground clutter and chaff as it
appears seconds after deployment. [Refs. 1,5,9]
Radar reflectors are primarily used in decoys to
create targetlike radar echoes. These devices may also be
built to create specific target sizes dependent on the
radar's freguency. The important reguirement for a good
radar reflector is that the generated echo approximate the
desired target size for the freguency band and viewing angle
of the victim radar. Van Atta arrays, Luneberg lens, and
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corner reflectors are examples of radar reflectors. [Ref.
1]
Aerosols are mists, fog, smokes, clouds, and similar
atmospheric disturbances designed to absorb, scatter, or
transmit a specific portion of any incident electromagnetic
wave. They can be used to hide aircraft from infrared and
other electromagnetic wave sensors as well as visually
directed threat systems. Aerosol effectiveness is dependent
on the level of reduction in the transmitted intensity of
the incident electromagnetic wave as it passes through the
aerosol. Thus, the level of reduction or extinction is
dependent upon the wavelength of the incident wave, and the
particle size and refractive index of the particle. [Refs.
1,9]
Flares are a self-protection device designed to
counter threats using infrared homing. As the infrared
homing missile approaches the aircraft, the flare is
dispensed to present a more attractive and realistic target
for the missile seeker to lock-on to, thereby increasing the
missile's closest point of approach. Several factors such
as bandwidth, intensity, burn time, time to reach peak
intensity, and deployment parameters must be considered in
the design and employment of flares. Aircraft maneuvers
after a flare is dispensed, as well as a reduction in power
to reduce the aircraft's infrared emissions, may be
necessary for the flare to be "seen." Flares are normally
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dispensed down from areas near the aft of the aircraft,
preferably in nonturbulent airflow to minimize the decrease
in infrared intensity caused by velocity effects. Care must
be taken to optimize dispensing velocity such that
sufficient distance exists between the aircraft and the
detonating warhead, but not so high as to prevent the
missile seeker form responding to the flare as it passes
through its field of view (FOV) . Additionally, judicious
use of engine afterburner is mandatory so that the large
increase in infrared emissions do not overpower the flare's
intensity and result in a self-defeating maneuver. [Refs.
1,5,9]
Future applications for expendables include the
concept of using relatively low-cost drones equipped with
active deception jammers flying in formation with the strike
group to act as attractive decoys or support jammers for use
against threat radar systems. [Ref. 1]
5. Threat Suppression
Threat suppression is comprised of actions taken by
friendly attacking forces to deny the enemy use of their
systems through physical damage or destruction. Specialized
aircraft performing this mission are normally equipped with
both passive detection systems capable of intercepting
threat radar systems and antiradiation missiles designed to
home in on the transmission from a radar antenna. In some
scenarios the mere presence of these assets is sufficient
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cause for a radar not to be used, thereby rendering it
inactive. However, physical destruction or damage is the
preferred method since intimidation doesn't remove the
threat or eliminate its ability to destroy aircraft in
subsequent scenarios. [Ref. 1]
6 . Tactics
Development of tactics provides to mission planners
the choice of optimum flight profiles, operations, and
formations for use in striking a particular target. The
tactics for a particular scenario are normally a function of
the intensity and lethality of the air defenses, the urgency
of the mission, types and numbers of aircraft available,
terrain, and weather. Optimum tactics are selected to
reduce the susceptibility of the aircraft involved by
minimizing exposure times to the threat systems without
compromising the performance characteristics of the
aircraft. Current tactics for attack and fighter aircraft
are numerous and include high-speed and low-altitude
penetration and egress, jinking maneuvers to defeat fire-
control flight path predictors and cause large miss
distances, evasive maneuvers to avoid approaching
propagators, avoidance of known threat sites, use of stand-
off weapons, nap-o f - the-Ea rth flight, terrain
masking/following, adverse weather operation and large
saturation attacks. In most instances, the friendly forces
in a particular scenario will use several of these tactics
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in an attempt to neutralize the threat systems' abilities
while maximizing offensive effectiveness. [Ref. 1]
C. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS ANALYSIS
Aircraft survivability is strongly influenced by its
susceptibility in a particular threat environment. Given a
generic land- or sea-based scenario, as described in Chapter
IV, a chronological sequence of the chain of events during a
scenario can be listed and examined, starting with the final
event and proceeding to the initial event. From this list,
the critical factors, i.e., the essential events and
elements in the scenario, can be identified that could, if
unchecked, cause damage to, or the destruction of, the
target aircraft. This analysis is referred to as an
essential elements analysis. [Ref. 1]
Once the essential events and elements have been
identified, the aircraft's ability to survive hinges on its
ability to interrupt this chain of events and degrade the
element's capabilities. By listing the susceptibility
reduction features of the aircraft and assessing their
impact on the sequence of events, an estimate of the
aircraft's susceptibility can be made. [Ref. 1]
1. A Simple Example of an EEA
To illustrate the EEA process, consider an encounter
between a friendly attack aircraft and a sea-based radar
directed, command guided SAM. The SAM system will normally
engage the attack aircraft once it has been detected,
85
identified as hostile, and tracked to a position where an
engagement can be made. The missile will be launched and
guided to the attack aircraft using some form of navigation.
If the missile comes close enough to the aircraft to cause
the SAM's proximity fuze to detonate the warhead, damage may
occur to the aircraft from the blast wave and the fragments.
[Ref. 1]
The EEA examines the above encounter, starting with
the final event, blast wave and/or fragments striking the
aircraft, and working backwards in time to the initial
event, i.e., the initial detection of the attack aircraft.
[Ref. 1]
For the blast wave or fragments to strike the
aircraft, the missile must pass sufficiently close to the
aircraft for the proximity fuze to detect the target and
detonate the HE charge. The damage to the aircraft is
directly related to the location of the aircraft and the
exploding warhead, to the fragment velocities and spray
angles, and to the relative velocity vectors and attitudes
of the aircraft and the missile. For the missile to come
close enough to cause fuze activation, the missile must be
powered and guided to within the effective range of the TDD.
For accurate guidance, accurate information relating
aircraft and missile relative positions and velocities must
be available. This requires the target and missile tracking
radar to provide complete and accurate tracking data to the
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fire control computer. For the tracking radar to obtain
this accurate tracking data, the attack aircraft must
present a radar return within the operating parameters of
the radar that are consistent with the radar's FOV
requirements. [Ref. 1]
This example is a very simplified analysis of the
chain of essential events. The essential elements
identified in this scenario are the missile's guidance
package, the fuze's TDD, the target aircraft, the tracking
radar, etc. By using a very detailed analysis to determine
all of the essential events and elements, and by examining
the impact the susceptibility reduction features available
to the target aircraft have on the events, an estimate of
the military worth of each feature can be made. [Ref. 1]
2 . EEAs for Three Specific Scenarios
This report considers three typical scenarios that
include engagements of a friendly aircraft by a surface
launched, semiactively guided missile equipped with a
proximity fuzed, HE fragmentation warhead, by a surface
based, radar guided AAA system using AP-I projectiles, and
by an enemy fighter using an onboard radar to launch an air-
to-air, IR homing missile with a radar proximity fuze.
The results of these EEAs are given in Tables 2
through 7 [Ref. 1] . At the top of each table are the six
susceptibility reduction concepts. Because performance is a
driving force in tactics development, the concept of tactics
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will only refer to the impact increased performance has on
this concept. On the left side of the table are the
essential events determined critical for each engagement in
a chronological order beginning with the projectiles or
fragments and blast striking the aircraft. To keep the
tables unclassified, the degree of degradation these
susceptibility reduction concepts have on two subsequent
events occurring is not provided; only a brief description
of the susceptibility feature considered to have an impact
is given. For signature reduction, any impact will be
indicated by an "X" which denotes possible impact on target
detection or lock-on ranges, and/or tracking capability.
[Ref. 1]
It's important to note that these EEAs are done with
the assumption that all of the susceptibility reduction
concepts and features listed are not indicative of current
or projected U.S. Navy aircraft capabilities. Additionally,
these EEAs will be conducted with the assumption that the
susceptibility reduction features listed in the tables are
inherent to the aircraft itself and are not provided by
other support aircraft. In other words, this aircraft is
performing the mission as an individual entity without the
support of any other assets, such as an EA-6B for jamming
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact
the six susceptibility reduction concepts of threat warning,
tactics, signature reduction, noise jammers and deceivers,
expendables, and threat suppression had on aircraft
survivability, with particular emphasis on both increased
aircraft performance (tactics) and signature reduction (RCS
and IR) . The conclusions and summary made are based on the





The relative impact threat warning information
provided by onboard RHAW or RWR equipment has on many
aspects of an aircraft's susceptibility is significant,
irrespective of the scenario. Without threat warning
available, the aircrews may not be aware of, or alerted to,
the enemy's presence and/or intent, thereby severely
degrading their opportunity to use noise jammers and
deceivers, DECM, expendables, and tactics to counter the
threat.
2 Increased Aircraft Performance
Increased aircraft performance, with threat warning,
has the greatest relative impact in the air-to-air scenario.
Once alerted to the presence of an enemy fighter by onboard
111
threat warning equipment or possibly by an onboard radar,
the added speed, maneuverability, and agility can be quickly
translated into maneuvers and tactics effectively taking
advantage of the tactical situation. If equipped with air-
to-air missiles or guns, engagement of the enemy may be
possible. Additionally, the added performance, maneuvera-
bility, and agility provide a capability to evade, avoid, or
degrade through the use of chaff, flares, and/or DECM, a
possible engagement by the enemy fighter.
Increased aircraft performance, with threat warning,
has a similar impact on the SAM and AAA essential events
during the surface based scenarios. If equipped with ARMs,
elimination of, or infliction of, damage to some of the
enemy's air defense radars may be possible. Additionally,
timely defensive maneuvers can be used in conjunction with
onboard DECM and expendables to preclude, degrade, or
terminate an engagement by either threat system.
Increased performance, with threat warning, may also
aid in reducing an aircraft's susceptibility by improving
the effectiveness of onboard countermeasures, such as DECM,
chaff, and flares, whose effectiveness is increased by
maneuvering during employment. The aircraft maneuvering may
decrease chaff bloom time, or give better positioning of a
flare in the threat system's FOV, thereby increasing the
effectiveness of both countermeasures techniques.
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Increased aircraft performance, with threat warning,
plays a more important role during the threat engagement
phase of each scenario, i.e., when the TTR attempts to
acquire the aircraft, than in the earlier phases. Because
the onboard RHAW and RWR equipment provides information only
on threat radar tracking systems, timely information about
the target acquisition and early warning radars is usually
not readily available. If this information was available
during the early phases of each scenario, steps might be
taken to take advantage of the aircraft's increased
performance to increase speed through a particular area,
thereby reducing the time spent in that area, or to quickly
maneuver to alter the aircraft's route of flight to avoid
known enemy activity. Furthermore, early positioning of the
aircraft through increased speed and maneuverability for the
most effective and efficient maximum range usage of the
aircraft's offensive weapons capability can also be
accomplished to maximize mission effectiveness.
3 . Signature Reduction
Signature reduction, with or without threat warning,
has a very significant impact on the essential events
irrespective of scenario. This independence of threat
warning is due to the fact that signature reduction features
are built-in the aircraft and are predominantly "install and
forget" features, such as shaping and the use of RAM. The
impact both RCS and IR signature reduction have on reducing
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an aircraft's susceptibility compliments, or in some cases
fills gaps in the onboard counter-measures capabilities.
This conclusion assumes the signature reduction efforts
effectively cover the required frequency bands, such as the
TTRs, as well as those for the TA and EW radars.
B . SUMMARY
The conclusions drawn in this study represent only a
small spectrum of the possible impacts increased aircraft
performance and signature reduction (both RCS and IR) have
on survivability. Because of the intent to keep the
classification of this report at the unclassified level,
open source literature precludes a total evaluation of the
relative impacts. However, the results of this study show
that both increased aircraft performance, with threat
warning available, and signature reduction, with or without
threat warning available, increase an aircraft's
survivability through a reduction in it's susceptibility.
Further study at a higher classification level may possibly
reveal the tradeoffs that must be made to achieve the
optimum levels of increased aircraft performance and/or
signature reduction. Additionally, a better understanding
of the effectiveness of these two susceptibility reduction
concepts, their impact on the other susceptibility reduction
concepts, and their impact on aircraft design and
survivability may be possible.
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